State Common Law
By the end of the nineteenth century, it was well established in state common law for personal injuries that industrial firms owed certain duties to disclose or warn workers and community residents of hidden hazards to health and safety.
Failure to perform these duties would result in corporate liability for negligence, and the award of compensatory damages to the injured workers or residents:
It is part of the implied contract between the employer and the employee that the latter assume the ordinary risks of the employment, which are apparent, and which he has the opportunity to detect.. all men are taken to understand that fire will burn, and water drown. But that there are many facts of science which do not come within the range of ordinary knowledge; and unless the employment teaches them, the employee will not be taken to know them, nor be bound to anticipate the danger therefrom. Thus, where one was employed to remove hot slag from a furnace in close proximity to water, it was held that he should not be presumed to know that if the slag came into contact with the water a dangerous explosion might follow. 4 Common law principles established "the duty of the master to see that the employee is not induced to work, supposing...the place in which the work is to be done is safe, when in fact it is not safe."5 To avoid a finding of fault and the attendant liability, an employer could choose among several options, each of which had the potential to prevent health risks to workers: for example, to voluntarily shut down the workplace, to remove the hidden hazards, or to disclose information to the employees at risk.
Employers frequently chose the third option, because they could use it to avoid liability in subsequent litigation by arguing that the informed employees had voluntarily assumed the risk of continued employment on an informed basis. Many courts found this affirmative defense persuasive, despite the fear of job loss and other coercive factors which belied the voluntariness of choosing continued employment. This generated public antagonism and support for a no-fault system for quickly compensating workers injured or diseased by job-related conditions. As a result, each state during the early decades of the twentieth century adopted a Workers' Compensation system.6 Similar duties were imposed on private firms by the common law to protect community residents and the firm's customers and contractors from a wide variety of hidden hazards. Thus, "a person approaching a railway crossing with intent to pass it...has a right to expect that the customary signals and warnings will be given on the approach of a train. "7 Liability was also imposed on firms which introduced dangerous substances into commerce, when their nondisclosure of hidden hazards contributed to subsequent harms. "Thus, one who delivered a carboy which he knew to contain nitric acid to a carrier without informing him of the nature of its contents, was held liable for an injury resulting by reason of the leaking of the acid, to another carrier to whom the carboy had been delivered by the first carrier... in the ordinary course of business."8 The common law thereby also provided a basis for allocating responsibility among manufacturers and their "downstream" commercial clients.
However, several factors converged to blunt the force of these common law principles. The state Workers' Compensation laws which eliminated the need to prove employer fault also barred tort suits by the injured workers against their employers; and community residents and others injured by hidden hazards who sought to use the common law to gain compensatory damages faced costly and complex evidentiary problems, particularly when technical uncertainty as to the existence of hazards and conflicting expert opinions as to their obviousness were involved, as is commonly the case for chemical exposures. As compensation became difficult or impossible for injured parties to secure, the legal principles lost their deterrent effects, their role as forces for risk prevention waned, and companies engaged in hazardous activities felt little legal or economic compulsion to identify and disclose hazards.
Nevertheless, the common law principles remain in force, and have been frequently and successfully invoked over the years in product liability suits brought by consumers injured by defective products. In recent years, workers suffering from diseases resulting from exposure to asbestos have used these principles and prevailed in lawsuits against Johns Manville and other suppliers of asbestos to their employers.9
Such "third-party" suits by workers against suppliers are not barred by Workers' Compensation law, and have led to numerous awards of compensatory damages, and of punitive damages in signficant amounts when willful non-disclosure by the supplier has been found. 10 In light of this renaissance of common law for occupational and product-related diseases, and the heavy corporate and insurer liability which has accrued in recent years, many companies are now abandoning non-disclosure as a corporate policy, and are trying to carefully structure new disclosure policies to avoid punitive damages, without inducing "hypochondria" among workers and community residents, unduly limiting "management prerogatives," or disclosing trade secret information. A major stimulus for new disclosure policies has also come from the "downstream" commercial customers of corporate products, which are now demanding more information from their suppliers before purchase, in order to choose safer supplies to protect themselves from future regulatory costs, tort litigation and liability. 1I
The renewed force of the common law has made disclosure an effective cost-containment measure in certain industries; and one can even envision some sort of utopian future in which management realizes that disclosure leads to reduction of health risks and costs, and is therefore consistent with cost containment and an increase in profits for the corporation.
State and Local Legislation
Many states, from Maine to California, have enacted rightto-know laws to provide a generic right of access to hazard information in the possession of private firms, state agencies, universities, and other organizations. Most of these laws confer the right to know on workers, and some also extend the right to citizens and to state and community officials. The laws vary considerably from state to state; and the lack of uniformity is increased by the web of other laws State Workers' Compensation laws and pre-trial discovery rules also afford access by claimants and litigants to certain records in the possession of private firms, and generally provide Compensation Boards and courts with the power to issue subpoenas for the disclosure of the records needed by the claimants. These opportunities usually become available after exposure and injury and serve primarily as aids in securing compensation. Indirectly, however, they often produce a deterrent effect on corporate risk management and lead to risk prevention measures in industry.
California provides the most fully developed state approach. But it also demonstrates that enacting a statute is only the beginning of a continuum of regulations and other activities that are essential for a state to grapple with hazard communication. Its generic'right-to-know law provides that employers and workers "have a right and a need to know the properties and potential hazards of substances to which they may be exposed... [and] that the rights and duties set forth...apply to all employers who use hazardous substances in this state, to any person who sells a hazardous substance to any employer in this state, and to manufacturers who produce or sell hazardous substances in this state..." 14 State officials are ordered to compile lists of hazardous substances from several specified sources, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), and various state agencies. Each firm subject to the law must then compile an MSDS for each hazardous substance, and update the MSDS on an ongoing basis. Most laboratories are excluded, and trade secrets are protectable by decisions to be made by the state's Director of Industrial Relations, but the statute does not set forth any guidance for such decisions.
The California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board has since promulgated several expansive regulations under the statute. These provide workers with the right to see and copy certain records held by their employer, including their medical and exposure records and those of other workers with similar jobs or work conditions, MSDSs on substances they are exposed to, and various medical surveillance, biological monitoring, and other workplace monitoring data. Although California provides a broad network of legal requirements, critical gaps are present (e.g., no labeling requirements for containers, nor specific penalty provisions for non-compliance), and the state does not extend access rights to community residents. However, 13 California communities have enacted community right-to-know ordinances to fill this gap.
The community right-to-know ordinances which have blossomed across the nation are even more highly diverse than those of the states. For example, the Pennsauken, New Jersey ordinance deals with chemical and radioactive substances and petroleum products, requires facility plot and storage plans, imposes hazard communication functions on facility owners or operators, requires certain disclosures (MSDSs to local health and fire officials and the town clerk), and site inspection twice a year, provides for citizen access to MSDSs on file with local officials, and prohibits expansion of storage capacity for toxics after April 1, 1982.17 These state and local laws represent exercises of the "police powers" left to the states by the federal Constitution, and constitute responses to societal values regarding the need to know privately held information which pertains to health and safety risks to workers and community residents. But they will be challenged in the courts, either on their face or as they are applied to particular situations.
The challenges will be based on a variety of legal doctrines, ranging from their alleged interference with interstate commerce, to their alleged taking without compensation of private property in trade secrets. Many provisions will be upheld, others deemed invalid. 1n addition, each law will require enforcement and the commitment of fiscal and human resources on a considerable scale for implementation.
Historically, many such state and local laws, even if legally sound, have failed to achieve their goals because of weak enforcement. Finally, the recent OSHA regulatory action provides a new basis for challenging these state and local efforts-federal preemption.
OSHA Regulation
Since 1970, OSHA has used its authority to regula$e various health and safety hazards in private workplaces.'6 Two types of OSHA regulations establish rights to know and duties to disclose: rules dealing with specific substances, and generic access to information rules.
OSHA rules for specific hazards such as coke oven emissions, asbestos, arsenic, acrylonitrile, cotton dust, noise, and lead each contain separate requirements for record compilation, reporting, and worker access.'9 Generic rights of access and duties to disclose are afforded by three OSHA rules: the rule on inspections under the "general duty" clause of the enabling statute, the access to medical and exposure records rule, and the new hazard communication rule.
Under the "general duty" clause and OSHA regulation, workers have the right to request OSHA inspection, and to be notified of any imminent dangers of death or serious physical harm discovered by the inspector. The effectiveness of this rule is dependent on worker initiative, OSHA inspection, and the extent to which proprietary claims limit disclosures. It is usually invoked after some exposure has occurred, and thus has a somewhat limited role in risk prevention.
The rule on employee access to medical and exposure records establishes generic access rights to such records kept by those employers whose workers are exposed to toxic sub- The rule initially provides that manufacturers (and importers) of chemicals provide their industrial customers, "downstream" firms in the manufacturing sector of industry which purchase the chemicals, with labeled containers and an MSDS for each purchased chemical which has been determined to be hazardous. It then requires that all firms in the manufacturing sector, "downstream" customers and chemical manufacturers themselves, provide information to their workers who will be exposed to the chemicals. The information consists of a written hazard communication program, labels on containers, MSDSs, posters, other information, and training. This does not extend to workers in firms that are not within the manufacturing sector (e.g., construction, commercial services, transportation, etc.) or to community residents; but these parties will probably be able to secure some of the information provided manufacturing employees through various means, even though they are not covered by the rule.
The duties and rights pertain only to chemicals deemed hazardous, because they are either: 1) among the over 600 substances designated by the rule,26 or 2) meet the performance criteria set forth in the rule and its appendices. 27 However, hazardous wastes, foods, drugs, pesticides, and certain other items are excluded; and the disclosure duty is limited to hazardous chemicals known "to be present in the workplace in such a manner that employees may be exposed under normal conditions of use or in a foreseeable emergency."
Thus, the burden of developing And passing along basic information (e.g., MSDSs) First, it directly addresses the prevention aspect of corporate risk management, since it intervenes in the earliest stages of the risk generation process, unlike the other access rules which are most useful after exposure to hazards.
Second, the nature of the intervention is such that it sets several forces in motion to improve management decisions. These include worker and union self-help measures, such as collective bargaining and litigation which can now be undertaken on a more informed basis; market forces engendered by better informed downstream customers who will seek the safer chemicals to contain their own costs of regulatory compliance and liability for injuries to workers and community residents; other economic forces such as those arising from new insurance rates for manufacturers, which can now be based more soundly on their differential risks, by insurance companies; and the development of more coherent information systems in industry which can be of considerable ongoing benefit to workers, community residents, and management itself in working to prevent risks.
Third, it reaffirms first principles, those of the common law which were developed to force the identification and disclosure of hidden hazards. This is of symbolic value in the sense that societal notions of responsibility found in common law are affirmed by regulation for a change, rather than eroded by regulation as is often the case with numerical standards for industrial activity which are often set by agencies such as EPA on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, which ignores responsibility. But the effects are likely to be more than symbolic, since the disclosures required by the rule will be useful as evidence in tort litigation for establishing judicial standards of reasonableness and responsibility in disputes involving industrial risks of various types-many of which lie beyond the scope of the rule.
But this rosey forecast must acknowledge one cloud of uncertainty-the potential preemptive effect of the federal rule on state laws, some of which are more stringent or health-protective in design. The rule provides that it is intended "to preempt any state law pertaining to this subject"; and that "any state which desires to assume responsibility in this area may only do so under the provisions of s. 18 [of the OSHActI," which requires OSHA approval of any such state effort.2
The OSHA Administrator has strongly supported preemption, arguing that a multiplicity of state laws will not be effective and will burden business unduly. He has "indicated that OSHA would not assert preemption over any state rules pending the effective date of the federal standard" (Nov. 25, 1985) * Its performance-oriented requirements for industry are at odds with the approaches of several states. In addition, particular circumstances may also compel certain state and local approaches which differ from that of the federal rule (e.g., fire and explosion hazards in areas where industry is densely concentrated). State and local provisions to protect community residents through hazard communication, which may be integrally related to the state worker protection provisions, are not dealt with by the OSHA rule. And the legislative history of the OSHAct reveals that state's rights proponents in Congress essentially prevailed in controversies over the drafting of several of its provisions relevant to the federal preemption issue.35
But OSHA, on the basis of section 18 of the Act, has ruled that a state plan "shall not include standards for products distributed or used in interstate commerce which are different from federal standards for such products unless such standards are required by compelling local conditions and do not unduly burden interstate commerce."36 Its comprehensive set of regulations for reviewing, approving, rejecting, and funding state plans has been in effect for several years. The diverse state and local laws are of variable quality and, based on historical experience, probably will provide less protection and enforcement in many states than would the OSHA A second option for the court would be to find total preemption on the basis of section 18 of the Act, thereby upholding the full OSHA program for approving state laws, and forcing the state to seek OSHA approval if it hopes to carry out its own right-to-know effort. After the likely OSHA denial of those right-to-know elements of the state plan which differ from the federal rule, the state could seek judicial review of the OSHA determination. On judicial review, the court would probably be faced with arguments that OSHA's denial was based on its erroneous findings that the state law was not justified by compelling local conditions, or that it unduly burdened interstate commerce. The OSHAct provides that the court, on judicial review, shall affirm the OSHA decision unless it is "not supported by substantial evidence. "38 A third option for the court would be to find partial preemption, and hold invalid only those elements of the state law which addressed exactly the same chemical products, for example, or the same firms or employees as the federal rule. This would force either OSHA-State coexistence, with each having its own separate and enforceable provisions on right-to-know; or state application for OSHA approval of the preempted provisions, OSHA's likely denial, and then judicial review of the OSHA denial under the substantial evidence test. The coexistence outcome would lead to more litigation because the applicability of coexisting federal and state laws to dynamic conditions in chemicals commerce would lead to numerous controversies. The latter outcome would most likely entail judicial review of OSHA findings that local conditions do not justify the state law, and that the state law unduly burdens interstate commerce.
The dismal prospect of such future litigation could be avoided if several steps are taken soon. OSHA could clarify that its rule has no intended preemptive effect on state common law and certain other state laws (e.g., access to employment records); and narrowly identify those aspects of state generic right-to-know statutes which conflict with the federal rule (e.g., state requirements pertaining to disclosure duties in the manufacturing sector only). It could then begin negotiation with state officials on these conflicting provisions to develop memoranda of understanding as to how they will be applied in a manner which does not obstruct the federal rule or unduly burden interstate commerce, and these memoranda could become part of OSHA-approved state plans.
This approach, although laden with problems, would still appear to be more useful in reaching an integrated and effective national system than the litigation approach. It is our one opportunity to close finally the circle of laws and regulations on right-to-know in the foreseeable future, and assure that the prevention of health risks to workers will become a more effectively conducted function of corporate management.
